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Victory for volunteerism? Scottish health board elections and participation in 
the welfare state 
Scott L. Greer1, Ellen A. Stewart2, Iain Wilson3, Peter D. Donnelly4.  
 
This paper presents findings from a multimethod study of pilot elections held to 
choose members of health boards in the National Health Service in Scotland. We 
begin by proposing that much current public involvement practice is dominated by a 
volunteerist model, in which members of the public with time and skills to offer play 
essentially supportive and non-challenging roles within health care organizations. 
This model contrasts sharply with the adversarial, political model of electoral 
democracy. Nonetheless, drawing on a postal survey of voters, non-participant 
observation of Boards, and semi-structured interviews with candidates, elected 
Board members and other stakeholders, we demonstrate that the introduction of 
elections did not overcome the volunteerist slant of current public involvement with 
health care organizations. Far from offering a ‘quick fix’ for policymakers seeking to 
ensure accountability of health care organizations, elections may produce 
remarkably similar outcomes to existing mechanisms of public involvement. 
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Introduction: The volunteerist model of participation in social services and the 
electoral alternative 
 
Establishing and evaluating public involvement in health care has long been a 
challenge for policy and practice. On one hand, public participation in decisions that 
spend public money and affect public services, employment, and health is desirable 
on democratic grounds and for its contribution to responsive, accountable, and 
appropriate health services (Tenbensel, 2010). On the other hand, defining, creating 
and evaluating effective democratic accountability and public involvement have been 
a stumbling block in many different health systems (Conklin, Morris & Nolte 2010, 
Klein and New 1998, Martin 2008). 
 One of the recurrent problems described in studies of public involvement is 
that the people who voluntarily participate in making and implementing health policy 
have distinctive characteristics. They are generally better educated, older, wealthier, 
and often whiter than the overall population (Church, Saunders, Wanke, Pong, 
Spooner & Dorgan 2002; Flinders, Matthews and Eason 2011; House of Commons - 
Health Committee, 1997). There are multiple dimensions of representation (Urbinati 
& Warren 2008) that are negotiated in public involvement practice (Martin 2008). 
Nonetheless, there is a clear tension between volunteers’ self-selectedness and 
thinking of them as representatives. The distorting effects of self-selection are widely 
acknowledged as a key challenge for new ‘participatory’ modes of public 
engagement (Warren 2009; Cain, Dalton & Scarrow 2003). These self-selected 
participants also frequently understand their role in ways that frustrate advocates of 
greater democracy (Litva et al 2002; Tritter & McCallum 2006): rather than 
representatives of the full range of community needs and views, ready to challenge 
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the decisions of the established organizations, it is common to find that those willing 
to engage more closely resemble meliorist volunteers. By meliorist volunteers we 
mean participants who seek simply to support organizations to do their jobs better. 
This may, in keeping with the wide range of roles fulfilled by volunteers in health 
systems (Naylor, Mundle, Weaks & Buck 2013; South, White & Gamsu 2013) and in 
line with the preferences of people who prefer to avoid overt politics (Eliasoph 2011) 
make it easier to run an organization, but it will rarely offer the kinds of scrutiny and 
challenge envisaged by advocates of democratic health care. 
 In response to discontent with existing practices of public involvement, and 
perhaps a sense that decision-making in general could be more effective, a variety of 
governments in New Zealand, Scotland, England and Canada have experimented 
with direct elections to health boards that provide or purchase a large part of their 
health care (Gauld 2010). This entails the introduction of the key tool of 
representative models of democracy – elections – into a field conventionally 
dominated by participatory or deliberative democratic modes of engagement. While 
diverse, and rooted in different historical experiences and structures, these 
experiments tend to test a hypothesis that elections will increase accountability and 
diversity of boards, shifting them away from a class-, age- and ethnically- biased 
composition with a volunteerist ethos toward one that better reflects community 
demographics or preferences.  
 This article examines the extent to which the intervention- direct elections to 
health boards- overcomes the strong tendency of public involvement to fall into what 
we characterize as a volunteerist model with both demographic and behavioral 
characteristics. We first sketch out the volunteerist model of public involvement, and 
why elections might introduce people, ideas, and motivations outside that model. We 
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then discuss a multimethod inquiry into direct elections in two Scottish health boards 
designed to investigate how far elections displace the volunteerist model by 
changing the membership or the behavior of boards. 
 
The volunteeristic model of public involvement 
Existing literature on public involvement in health emphasizes problems of 
conceptualization and definition (Wait & Nolte 2006; Contandriopoulos 2004). This is 
an area replete with practical accounts but unusually dominated by a small number 
of theoretical models which categorize public involvement by the degree of 
‘empowerment’ it offers (Stewart 2013). The most notable instance of this is 
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation which plots participation along a continuum 
from the bottom rungs of therapy and manipulation to the author’s goal of citizen 
control of services. This basic conceptual structure – ranking instances of public 
involvement by the degree to which they offer empowerment – has been the basis 
for a range of models of public involvement in health (Tritter & MacCallum 2006; 
Charles and Di Maio 1993; Feingold 1977; Thompson 2007). Despite the tendency 
to disaggregate involvement into multiple options, many of these conceptual 
frameworks demonstrate a disjuncture between change-oriented activities drawing 
on a democratic understanding of involvement, and a less challenging consumeristic 
perspective from which effective public involvement may look very similar to 
thorough market research.   
In this paper, based on extensive data collection from our case study, we 
explore the implications of a specific reform in the Scottish NHS. We contrast 
volunteerism with political activism. These are two recognizable, but rarely 
articulated, ideal types (in the Weberian sense) of public involvement. There are 
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tensions between them, which come across more strongly when we think of them as 
contrasting conceptions of how public services like healthcare should be governed, 
rather than points on a continuum.  These tensions were starkly illustrated by our 
case study, in which elections to health boards forced real decision-makers to 
address these tensions in very practical ways.  
We propose that much public involvement in health services – including 
strategic public roles such as Board membership – is normally volunteerist rather 
than activist. In a literature that often starts from the assumed benefits of any 
participation (Putnam, 2000), the distinction is not consistently articulated (Harre, 
2007). The substantial sociological literature on volunteering – that is “any activity in 
which time is given freely to benefit another person, group, or organization” (Wilson 
2000, p215) – preoccupies itself with the predictors and consequences of 
volunteering activity (Wilson 2000; Wilson 2012). Volunteering is argued to yield a 
range of benefits for the individuals and the societies in which they volunteer (Verba, 
Schlozman & Brady 1995; Oman, Thoresen & McMahon 1999; Harlow & Cantor 
1996; Casiday 2008). In tune with these positive findings, creating opportunities for 
members of the public to volunteer within health care organizations is increasingly 
seen as a progressive step, associated with improved information-sharing and 
outcomes (Naylor, Mundle, Weaks, & Buck, 2013; South, White, & Gamsu, 2013).  
More relevant to our thesis is the vexed issue of the relationship between 
volunteering and activist (or at least change-oriented) pursuits. Simply put, are public 
involvement roles a cog in an organizational machine, or do they transform the 
organizational machine from the inside? Wilson argues that the categories of 
volunteerism and activism are mere social constructions, between which individuals 
will shift as circumstances change and that accordingly “there is no good sociological 
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reason to study them separately” (Wilson 2000, p217). However, other authors have 
fruitfully done so: Markham and Bonjean (1995) distinguish ‘establishment-oriented’ 
and ‘confrontational’ tactics of volunteers in a women’s organization; Caputo (1997) 
investigates the extent to which female volunteers sought to ‘change social 
conditions’; Eliasoph (2011) explores the complex interplay of ‘empowerment’ and 
bureaucratic routine in civic associations. We propose that pursuing the distinction 
between activism and volunteerism in accounts of public involvement in health can 
be analytically valuable. In health boards, for example, members of the public serve 
as directors alongside senior executives. Whether they automatically approach those 
directors as collaborators, or foresee situations in which their interests could conflict 
with those of the wider public, may have profound implications in practice. 
A ‘volunteerist’ model of public involvement emphasizes collaboration and 
service over challenge and opposition. The core concept of the volunteerist model is 
that members of the public who choose to engage with health policy and planning, 
for little or no remuneration, are engaged for a distinct set of reasons. Volunteers are 
often semi-retired or retired professionals, frequently from the public services, who 
seek to continue their contribution to the public good, and use their managerial or 
technical skills by participating in health services decision-making. This set of 
descriptives more or less predicts that they will be disproportionately higher-income, 
more highly educated, and older. They will tend to have professional backgrounds, 
frequently in public services, which they have been socialized to believe provide the 
skills to ameliorate social problems (Wilson 2000: 219-23). Because their interest is 
meliorism, perhaps inspired by gratitude or a sense of obligation, rather than a 
specific issue, they will not usually have special reliance on health services due to 
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current poor health, disability, or caring responsibilities. Activists, or aspiring 
professional politicians, would presumably have somewhat different demographics.  
 Beyond their demographics, a volunteerist model suggests participants will 
have a coherent ideology with the following characteristics: 
- a community orientation, focused on the community as a whole without highlighting 
specific interest groups (and possibly actively hostile to perceived special interests); 
- the ability to accept an institutionally bounded definition of community, serving the 
community assigned to the  relevant public institution; 
- a resistance to party politics, and to the instrumentalization of local decision-making 
by those interested in political careers; their politics are by avocation rather than 
vocation, in Weber’s terms.  
- a desire to contribute to the welfare of an organization, accepting its basic ongoing 
activities and values; 
- a willingness to defer to the organization’s hierarchy rather than confront it. 
 In short, a volunteerist model would suggest that people willing to engage with 
health care organizations are people who wish to help the organization on its own 
terms, without substantially questioning its basic activities or seeking to introduce 
contentious politics. The idea is to reinforce and support, rather than critique or 
change it. This does not imply that these volunteers do not have valuable, and in 
some cases, specialist skills to offer. There is strong evidence that NHS 
organizations, and many other health systems have many ways to work within a 
volunteerist paradigm in order to benefit from the knowledge and skills of such 
outside volunteers (Naylor, Mundle, Weaks & Buck 2013). Rather, the skills and 
experience of these individuals are put to work in the service of an organization, 
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rather than in the service of a mission to make that organization substantively 
different. 
 
The electoral alternative 
 
The volunteerist model of public involvement - participatory opportunities populated 
by supportive members of the public who overwhelmingly share demographic 
characteristics and an eagerness to be helpful – makes the day-to-day life of an 
organization easier, but will rarely yield thoroughgoing or transformational 
engagement. What kinds of policy changes, treatments, could overcome the biases 
in the volunteerist model of public involvement? Elections are perhaps the ultimate 
tool to establish popular accountability for decision makers: while elections might be 
used for a variety of reasons (Barnett et al 2009), replacing unelected rulers  with 
elected representatives is universally taken as a sign of some democratization.  
Having elections is not always better than not having elections, but elections 
can bring important benefits. In principle, they could bring communities in, both by 
allowing the electorate to choose board members who more closely resemble 
themselves in ideological or demographic terms, and by forcing board members to 
be more attentive to potential community discontent, opposition, and benefits when 
they make their decisions. If the offices attract serious campaigns, especially 
campaigns run by political parties, they might also benefit from the proven expertise 
of parties in mobilizing voters and gaining attention, thereby further increasing the 
visibility and accountability of the board while meshing it into the broader political 
system.  It might produce uncomfortable situations for managers and ministers, since 
it might lead to ambitious young party politicians, local campaigners, interest group 
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representatives and even local celebrities serving on boards, and it could create 
incentives for members to take constantly oppositional stances.  
 
Conflicting logics 
 
What happens when an electoral logic is introduced into organizations, such as the 
middle tier of health services, which are still accountable to ministers for their 
budgets and priorities? One possible outcome would be a victory for the logic of 
elections: that interest groups and political parties will support candidates who agree 
with them, that candidates will try to establish public profiles, taking popular stances 
and trying to identify themselves with concrete benefits, that candidates will be 
integrated into larger political contests, both seeking careers in politics and using 
their positions to score points for their supporters (by, for example, using a seat on a 
board to criticize government health policy). In other words, elections could 
significantly affect the role.  
 An alternative would be that the properties of the health organization would 
muffle the impact of elections. Limits on the powers of the organization, and the 
limited powers of a board would mean that it would continue to attract the same kind 
of volunteers. In such a scenario, the restrictions on board members, and the 
organizations themselves, within the context of NHS systems where power lies in the 
government, would mean that political parties, campaigns, and interest groups would 
not focus on electing and influencing board members. Instead, advocates, ambitious 
politicians, and interest groups would continue to focus on more important elected 
offices and leave the health services to now-elected volunteers.  
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 We expect that the volunteerist model will trump the electoral model of public 
participation, even in the extreme case of direct elections to health boards. We 
expect that this will be because, despite the availability of remuneration (£8000 a 
year), citizens who engage will be interested in health board membership for the 
same reasons that they are interested in other volunteer positions: a sense that the 
organization is providing a worthwhile public service, and that its objectives and 
procedures are sound. We expect that this victory of volunteerism would happen 
because in public consciousness, administrative practice, and law, the powers of 
bodies such as health boards are limited and real power lies with the minister and 
legislature. As a result, people interested in a fundamental critique of the health 
services, in contesting particular policies, or in having a political career, will direct 
their energy elsewhere and leave participation in the health organization to those 
who have extra time and would like to assist the organization; volunteers, of the sort 
already involved in public engagement.  
 
Data and Methods: Identifying volunteerism at work 
 
Our objective is to contribute to the international literature on public involvement in 
health policy by determining whether volunteerism was the dominant model for 
public participation via elected positions in this case, rather than more thoroughly 
democratic and conflictual approaches. Our case study is a multimethod study of an 
experiment in Scotland, where two National Health Service Boards (out of a total of 
fourteen territorial Boards across Scotland) introduced direct elections to their 
governing boards in 2010. Our research was conducted from early 2010 until late 
2012.  
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Identifying volunteerism at work 
  
Our strategy for identifying the volunteerist model at work has two mutually 
reinforcing components. One is demographic and quantitative, and implies that this 
kind of time-consuming, bureaucratically demanding volunteerism, with its basically 
community-service orientation, will continue to attract people with time, skills, and 
good health, rather than a cross-section of service users.  
 The second is behavioral, best tested with qualitative interview data. We 
examine the expressed motivations of those who seek to participate, and their 
interpretations of their current or potential roles. A volunteerist model suggests they 
will express their support in terms of contribution, help, and support rather than 
opposition, or fundamental criticism. They should see their ‘constituency’ as the 
broad population for which the organization is responsible rather than specific 
groups, agendas, or interests. We would also expect those in the volunteerist mode 
to shy away from party political activity and clearly defined political agendas.  
 Our specific hypotheses are therefore: 
Hypothesis 1: Volunteerist participants in elected health boards will be older and 
better educated than the general population, and not have clear user interests as 
carers, parents, or patients. 
Hypothesis 2: Volunteerist participants in elected health boards will be interested in 
contributing to, rather than critiquing, the organization and its decisions, and will 
show this by not seeking out opportunities to publicly critique the organization, and 
will accept constraining norms of board member behavior dating to before the 
elections.  
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The Scottish health board pilots of 2010 
 
Our data comes from a multimethod  research project, undertaken as part of a 
statutory evaluation of the Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act 
2009. This Act provided for the Scottish Government to pilot changes in the 
composition of the boards that govern Scottish health boards. Traditionally, members 
of the public were appointed by the minister after independent vetting. Now, most 
would be elected. 
Scotland’s fourteen territorial health boards are impressively large 
organizations, responsible for the planning and provision of almost all health services 
in their areas in Scotland’s non-marketised health system (Greer 2004). In 2011/12 
the territorial Boards received 9, 615 million GBP of a total NHS Scotland budget of 
11,714 million GBP (Audit Scotland 2012, p7). Despite these significant powers, they 
are constrained by a number of central Government requirements, including the 
need to break even in each financial year, and are held to a defined range of 
performance targets known as HEAT targets (Audit Scotland 2012). There is no 
formal representation of the territorial Boards at central level (as is the case with the 
NHS Confederation in England), but senior officers from the different regions “meet 
regularly and have easy access to ministers and officials in the Scottish 
Government” (Steele and Cylus 2012, p26). Therefore while health boards are major 
budget-holders, they are conventionally seen more as ‘policy-takers’ than ‘policy-
makers’. Decisions taken (and not taken) at Board level have consequences for the 
wider organization, but are rarely dramatic and frequently incremental. While it is not 
unheard of for Boards to criticize central Government, it is extremely rare, and the 
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sense of accountability to central Government is strong. This has implications for 
their visibility and relationship with the publics that they serve. When asked about 
lines of accountability, Health Secretary Nicola Sturgeon stated explicitly at the 2010 
induction for newly elected Board members that she expected Boards would remain 
accountable to her, despite a majority of their members being elected. 
        “Board” in the Scottish NHS can refer both to these large organizations and to 
the group of directors overseeing each of them. The governing boards include 
directors who are also senior managers, representatives of interest groups, and 
others selected from among the general public served by the board. NHS Boards 
have governing boards of directors responsible for “strategy” and “governance” 
(Committee on Standards in Public Life 1995). This group of directors are involved in 
overseeing the actions of professional managers (by, for example, reviewing annual 
accounts) and making particularly important or high-profile decisions. They are not 
supposed to involve themselves in ‘operational matters’ and nor do they fulfill much 
of an “external role” (Skelcher 1998, p104) dealing with the public and other 
stakeholders, except in a quasi-ceremonial figurehead capacity. 
It was into two of these governing boards that direct elections for members 
were introduced in May 2010, following central government concern that some 
controversial Board decisions including contentious hospital closures had “ridden 
roughshod over community opinion” (Sturgeon, quoted in The Scottish Government 
2009).  
The two board areas chosen to pilot elections, NHS Dumfries and Galloway 
and NHS Fife, both had their boards reconfigured so that directly elected Non-
Executive Directors plus a local councilor nominated by local government and 
appointed by the minister would have a majority. The rest of the boards were 
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composed of Executive Directors (on the board ex-officio, e.g. the Chief Executive) 
and a few traditional, appointed, Non-executive Directors. The elections took place 
ending in May 2010, following a communications campaign devised and 
implemented by staff of the two Boards. Standing as a candidate and voting were 
presented in advertising materials as ‘exciting’ and ‘new’ opportunities. They were 
postal votes, with a limit of £250 campaign expenditure, and candidates were not 
asked for a deposit. Candidates were invited to write a 250 word electoral address. 
These addresses were bound into a book and sent to eligible voters along with a 
ballot. The elections used the Single Transferable Vote mechanism.  
 
Methods 
 
We used a mixed-methods approach to develop a fully rounded picture of both public 
engagement and Board functioning during the pilots. The University of St Andrews 
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee granted ethical approval for the research. 
We surveyed a random sample of 6000 names from the electoral register, 
3000 each from Fife and from Dumfries and Galloway. We sent a survey form to 
electors’ registered addresses within a few days of the election, with two reminders if 
required, asking whether they had voted in the Health Board Elections. It also asked 
how much information they had about the elections and how interested they were in 
them. The survey collected data on age, sex, ethnicity, education, length of 
residence in the Board area, disability, carer status, dependent children, general 
health and contact with the NHS (a copy of the survey form is available as 
supplementary data to this article). All forms were marked with an identifying number 
that allowed us to confidentially link electors’ responses to a postcode, which 
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showed responses were not coming disproportionately from electors living in affluent 
or deprived areas. This survey attracted a fair response rate of 31%, as calculated 
from the official electoral register. That register will not be perfectly up-to-date (Wilks-
Heeg et al 2010) and forms sent to out-of-date addresses will have artificially 
reduced the response rate. Given the quasi-official nature of our survey, we were not 
able to use established techniques such as in-person follow-up or financial 
incentives to increase that response rate (see Dillman 2000). We were also 
surveying over the summer, and low turnout in the election itself raises questions 
about how salient this subject was for electors (see Martin 1994).  
We also sent survey forms to all the candidates, which collected similar 
demographic data and requested interviews. Eighty three (64%) of the 130 
candidates replied.  
Qualitative data collection included longitudinal non-participant observation 
and over 200 semi-structured interviews between March 2010 (two months before 
the election) and April 2012. All candidates were invited to take part in an interview 
and 85 (of 130) candidates were interviewed. We interviewed 55 Board members 
both prior to and post election. We requested interviews with all elected non-
executives, all existing non-executives (including those whose appointments were 
‘terminated’ to make space for new elected members), and key executive members 
of each Board. The 55 interviews completed include all elected members, 10 
executive directors and 13 appointed non-executives who remained in place 
(including councilors and Chairs) . After the elections, the total number of Board 
members in Fife and Dumfries & Galloway was 42, and we are confident that there 
are no significant omissions in our qualitative sampling. Additional interviews were 
conducted with selected NHS staff (for example, those responsible for 
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communications or public involvement strategies) and other stakeholders (for 
example, representatives of local voluntary sector organizations) in each Board area. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted by three of the authors working with a 
common interview schedule, but informed by our observation of Board meetings and 
committees. Many Board members were interviewed on multiple occasions during 
the pilot.  
We also observed the induction for newly elected members, as well as 
meetings of the full Boards and a number of their committees over the duration of the 
study, to understand how the views expressed in interviews played out in the day-to-
day business of Board functioning. While spending significant amounts of time in 
Board events and interviewing members, we took a non-participant role, aiming to 
minimize the impact of our presence. All parties were aware of our remit as 
Government-commissioned independent evaluators of the pilot, and at times may 
have moderated their behavior accordingly. However our confidence in our findings 
is increased by the prolonged period of fieldwork, coupled with extensive 
triangulation of data sources.  
All authors discussed emerging themes regularly during data collection, and 
an initial thematic framework of empirically-grounded ‘sensitising concepts’ (Blumer 
1954) developed from these discussions. This emphasized how candidates and 
Board members described their own roles (for example, their goals for their Board 
membership, whether they understood themselves as representing the public, and 
whether and how they interacted with members of the public as a Board member). 
This framework was refined as interview transcripts were analyzed by two of the 
authors using NVivo software and was informed by field notes. Data was analyzed 
within categories and then compared within Boards to ensure appropriate awareness 
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of context. Coding was regularly shared and discussed within the team. The 
descriptive, empirically-grounded thematic framework was developed into the higher 
level conceptualization of volunteerism during research team discussions, and 
clarified with reference to existing relevant literature.  
 
 
Results 
 
We test Hypothesis One primarily with quantitative data: did the demographic 
characteristics of candidates, voters, and victors differ significantly from the 
characteristics of people appointed to non-executive director positions, or resemble 
those of the two board areas’ populations? We test Hypothesis Two with qualitative 
data: did directly elected board members choose to challenge and campaign, or did 
they view their contribution in terms of support and advice? 
 
Demographics 
We have a broad idea of the demographics of appointed non-executive directors 
across Scotland: the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments in Scotland 
(OCPAS) produces an annual report. These figures are for all public appointments in 
Scotland, but health boards follow a similar pattern. Most applicants for public 
appointments in 2010 were male (69.5%), white (97.7% were not from minority 
ethnic groups) and aged at least 49 (78.9%) (Public Appointments Commissioner 
2011:5). How different were directly elected non-executives, candidates, and the 
voters who chose them?  
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 The 64% of candidates in the elections who responded to our surveys were 
actually demographically similar to typical volunteers for public appointments. We 
found that the candidates were typically well-educated and lived in relatively wealthy 
postcodes. 96% described themselves as white; unsurprising in two overwhelmingly 
white areas of Scotland. However, we were surprised to find that few were intense 
users of the health service. Most were relatively healthy themselves and did not 
report long-term caring responsibilities. 36% of candidates were aged 41-60, and 
51.8% were aged 61-80. One was under 18. In total, 71% of the candidates were 
men.  
 Election turnout was low (Table 1) and many voters reported feeling poorly-
informed about the election. Our survey showed that the voters who did turn out 
substantially mirrored the age profile of the candidates. Older electors were much 
more likely to vote, and a person aged 60-80 was more than twice as likely to vote 
as somebody aged 18-40 (Table 2).  
 
[insert ##Tables 1,2##] 
 
 Third, the eventual victors for the non-executive board positions were all aged 
over 40, with 60% of them over 60 (Table 3). While their gender balance was almost 
equal (equal in Fife and 60% male in Dumfries and Galloway), the level of 
educational qualifications was markedly higher than the average for their areas (all 
but 3 of our respondents had at least college-level qualifications, many had 
university or postgraduate degrees). Most did not have significant caring or childcare 
responsibilities, and did not report serious ill health (although one disabled-rights 
activist was elected). 
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 In other words, the demographics suggest that this was an election dominated 
by relatively healthy, retired or semi-retired, often professional, people. Such a 
population fits with the demographics we would expect of a volunteerist model in 
Scotland.  As we expected, time-consuming, bureaucratically demanding board 
activity with an important managerial component attracted people with time, 
managerial skills, and good health. This coincides with the literature on volunteering 
patterns, which shows that demanding and time-consuming volunteer roles, 
especially in the health sector (Wilson 2000,p221) tend to attract older, well-
educated volunteers who are in reasonable health. Revealingly, Wilson found that 
older people tend to volunteer for meliorist, helping roles: confrontational activism 
tends to attract younger volunteers (Wilson, 2000). 
 
[Insert ##Table 3##] 
 
  
Board behavior 
Elected members received two days of joint induction training, and the two Boards 
each organized two days of local induction at their own sites. This induction differed 
from the normal induction process for new Board members insofar as new members 
typically arrive as individuals or as very small groups. Beyond this the content of 
induction was broadly consistent with that offered to an appointed Board member. 
That is, training concentrated on getting new (and in some cases comparatively 
inexperienced) Board members ‘up to speed’ with NHS management and Board 
procedures. It did not direct attention towards reshaping the non-executive role. 
However elected members arrived onto Boards with their own mandate, and with 
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little central direction as to how they should conduct themselves as regards the 
public.  
Once on the boards, the question is whether the directly elected board 
members did actually behave according to the volunteerist model- did they view their 
activity as contributing to the board on its terms, or challenging the decisions of the 
board and the government policies it implemented?  
 There was one elected member out of 25 who did adopt a fully oppositional 
attitude, engaging in traditional political activities such as writing to the press, 
organizing public meetings, asking to have her dissent minuted in board minutes, 
raising new agenda items in public meetings, giving quotes to journalists and 
seeking to carry out promises she made in her 250-word election address in 
opposition to existing Board policy. This person had long experience as a local 
political activist, and eventually left the board to campaign for local health care 
outside its constraints while seeking other electoral office, describing the decision 
thus: 
“If you introduce an elected members system into a region where there has 
been community concern about something like the Community Hospital 
closures you have to accept that there may be members of the health board 
elected who have been community campaigners. I would have thought it was 
fairly inevitable and it really is very unfair then to expect that community 
campaigner to stop being a community campaigner and just somehow 
knuckle down and toe the line. (Interview, elected non-executive director) 
This raised obvious tensions given that boards are constrained by government 
policy. 
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A local hospital campaigner who was also elected gave some personal quotes to the 
press, which was unconventional compared to appointed members, but otherwise 
integrated into the board. Other directly elected board members, some with 
extensive local political experience and ambitions, kept a low public profile or 
conducted their media activity in coordination with the Chair and communications 
staff of the boards. In other words, contrary to the fears of those who expected 
damaging politicization, the result of elections was that the amount of political 
activity, campaigning, and publicly voiced dissent increased only marginally.  
One reason for this consistency with previous Board practice was the strength 
and durability of norms of ‘corporate responsibility’, whereby members are 
collectively responsible for the decisions of the Board, and will publicly support them. 
This is not to say that individual views are not aired in appointed health boards, but 
this mostly takes place prior to the decision, and by convention any vigorous 
disagreements would be conducted privately, outside of Board meetings. Notably, 
though, most of these norms are informally known and enforced, with little about the 
Board member’s role enshrined in statute. Newly elected members, particularly given 
their critical mass with large numbers elected onto each Board in a highly unusual 
influx of new members, could have sought to reimagine ‘how things are done’ in 
Boards. Boards greeted their new members with suggestions about policies 
regarding, for example, media relations for individual board members (“gave them 
guidance” as one established member put it). The newly elected members largely 
accepted these approaches.  
 The reason for the reluctance of elected members to redefine their roles in 
keeping with the political manner of their recruitment lies in their own motivations for 
seeking office. The interviews we conducted with board members suggest that the 
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overwhelming majority did not join the Board in the pursuit of particular agendas. 
Asked why they ran, most elected Board members used volunteerist language of 
contribution and representation rather than oppositional or politicized language of 
challenge: 
 
I felt I could give something towards the community really ... with sort of that 
knowledge that I’ve got about the health [service]. (Interview, elected non-
executive director) 
 
I had felt that I wanted to do something … worthwhile seems to be the right 
term, that seems a bit worthy. But something that I would enjoy doing, that 
was valued but not in a commercial organisation. That was what I wanted to 
do. (Interview, elected non-executive director) 
 
I’ve got some background on the thing, understanding about the various 
problems in society and obviously on the health issues and I thought `maybe 
if I went on there I can maybe help them out and give them some support’. 
(Interview, elected non-executive director) 
 
For a small number of elected members, their motivation to stand was rooted not 
merely in conservative loyalty to the existing organization but in explicit opposition to 
the principle of elected Boards, and fear about the consequences of politicization for 
the board:  
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Now even being the elected Board member, I personally think [the pilot 
election] is a disaster and to a degree I put myself forward a little bit ‘tongue in 
cheek’. (Interview, elected non-executive director) 
 
It is worth noting that a desire to contribute to an organizational mission - rather than 
change it - was also the stated motivation of many of the appointed non-executive 
members before the pilots began. The key motivational difference between the 
appointed and elected members was that conventionally appointed members often 
identified their personal contribution as specific to their professional expertise and 
skills, often in finance or law. By contrast elected members were more likely to 
identify themselves as offering the perspective of an ‘ordinary member of the public’ 
or, in the case of the health professionals, knowledge of the health system from the 
frontline.   
 In short, and to the relief of many who had speculated that boards with 
elected majorities would fill with dissenters and ambitious politicians, the actual 
behavior of most elected board members was consonant with a volunteerist model. 
They adopted the norms and roles of Non-Executive Directors with minimal 
modification. The member who sought to introduce the challenge and oppositional 
critiques of a normal democratic legislature had an exhausting experience and 
resigned in frustration to pursue other political and campaigning routes.  
 
Discussion  
 
The rhetoric that accompanied the political launch of the pilot elections in Scotland 
suggested a radical departure from existing models of health service management:  
24 
 
“[Elected Boards] are the best way of ensuring that boards will no longer be able to 
ride roughshod over community opinion, as has happened in the past. The voices of 
people whose taxes pay for the NHS will now have to be listened to and acted upon” 
(Sturgeon, quoted in The Scottish Government, 2009). Appointed to evaluate the 
impact of the pilots, we spent two years observing and hearing about a far more 
moderate outcome. Our evidence suggests that, in the absence of direction from 
central government on how to ‘be’ an elected member, the profile and motivations of 
those members of the public who engaged with the elections remained consistent 
with a volunteerist model of involvement .  
Our quantitative evidence suggested that participation in the two Scottish 
health boards elections was predominantly confined to the 41-80 age brackets. 
Candidates, and especially victors, were generally in a good state of health and 
educationally well qualified. Given that it was very easy to declare candidacy (and 
that restrictions on campaigning limited the resources required), the pronounced age 
pattern in the candidates suggests that a chance to influence the middle range of 
health services management in this way does not necessarily engage the poor the 
young, or other marginalized groups.  
 Our qualitative evidence shows that the vast majority of elected board 
members did not challenge the board, falling instead into a volunteerist paradigm of 
assisting the organization in its work of good governance, oversight, and discussion 
of strategic initiatives. Only a few members made any effort to challenge board 
procedures in an oppositional mode that would permit more campaigning, critique, 
and opposition, and they either ceased their efforts or, in the most articulate case, 
left the board.   
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 The reasons why the apparent high hopes of policymakers were thwarted by 
‘business as usual’ are complex, but we argue that the minimal impact of the 
elections stemmed from the nature of Boards, and the public’s relationship with 
them. Boards are arms-length bodies that act within the confines of central 
government policy. For several decades Boards have epitomized a managerialist, 
technocratic approach to managing health services, working within regimes of 
performance measurement and management (such as central government targets) 
(Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald & Petticrew 1996). Board members are far from 
irrelevant: they can clearly influence some aspects of organizational behavior. 
However individuals who wish to bring about significant change, rather than to offer 
oversight of continuing performance, are likely to spend their limited time on other 
‘outsider’ tactics. Given that most citizens have limited political energies to devote to 
the day-to-day administration of public services (Warren 2009), those individuals 
who volunteer (or self-select) for duties, even when these duties are presented as 
opportunities for participation and empowerment, are unlikely to have radical aims.  
 For some, the philosophical case for direct election of local decision-makers 
negates any scope for cost-benefit analysis of electoral outcomes. In the case of 
adding an additional layer of representation to organizations already ‘vertically’ 
accountable to the public through central government, however, we argue that it is 
reasonable to look for demonstrable change in return for the financial costs and 
upheaval of the intervention. A concern with the ‘value for money’ of elections, while 
at odds with a principled commitment to them, was the key reason cited for the 
abandonment of elected Boards in a number of Canadian provinces (Lomas, 2001; 
Saskatchewan Health, 2001). In New Zealand, where elected health boards have a 
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long and significant (if interrupted) history, Laugesen and Gauld (2012) argue that 
attachment to them is ‘instinctive’.  
Elections to health care organizations are persistently ‘sold’ as radical shake-
ups of existing management models. Yet the enduring social underpinnings of public 
engagement in health care policies are those of volunteerism rather than contentious 
politics. Elections will not change the management of public services, it seems, if 
they empower only the same categories of public-spirited people who staff other 
public engagement efforts by serving as lay committee members and participating in 
public consultations for organizations whose basic accountability lies elsewhere, in 
the government.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Much literature on public engagement in health remains rooted in a 1960s approach 
to community participation that simply regards the point of public engagement as 
increased public power over decisions (Arnstein, 1969). When applied to the 
question of elections to health bodies, this assumption has two issues: elections give 
public services a new set of ‘horizontal’ accountabilities which may conflict with their 
established ‘vertical’ accountabilities to nationally-elected ministers and legislatures 
(Dixon, Storey & Rosete 2010); and many public participants in public services 
obstinately seem to hold values and seek ends other than the control over the 
organization that many scholars impute to them (Tritter & McCallum, 2006).  
 The implication for the literature on public participation is that those people in 
a community who wish to vote for or occupy an electoral office in health service 
management may well turn out to be volunteerist in demographics and orientation. 
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Other mechanisms, including designed (not self-selecting) mini-publics (Warren, 
2009), might be more practical ways to seek the opinions of those segments of a 
community that do not have a volunteerist orientation. Elections will not be enough to 
incorporate their views, or have the radical consequences Arnstein (1969) sought, if 
elections reproduce volunteerism in candidates, electors, and victors.  
 The policy implication is simple: it is not clear that governments will get 
pronouncedly different results from elections as compared to existing mechanisms of 
public involvement: lay committee members, consultations and standing consultative 
groups, and public opinion investigations such as surveys and focus groups. In 
Canada (Lomas 2001), in England (Dixon, Storey & Rosete 2010), and now in 
Scotland, elections to health bodies have failed to deliver the transformational 
changes promised in policy rhetoric. Scotland’s experiment suggests that elections 
offer no viable halfway point between politics and volunteerism, and that many of the 
people involved prefer volunteerism. 
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